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Cannon v. Miller: The Brief Death of Alienation of Affections
and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina
Two facts were certain: that on October 15, 1979, Haywood Cannon and
his wife Rachel were separated, and that on May 20, 1981, they were divorced. 1
The circumstances of Rachel's relationship with Jeffrey Miller were less clear.
Few would have approved had it begun before Rachel's separation from Hay-
wood, but perhaps the relationship began innocently after the Cannons' mar-
riage had finally failed. This moral distinction, however, does not make a
difference under the tort law of North Carolina. In either event, the law offers
"heart balm' 2 to Haywood. If Rachel and Jeffrey had engaged in sexual rela-
tions before the divorce, Haywood could recover damages in an action for crimi-
nal conversation-despite the couple's separation. 3 If the relationship began
before the separation, Haywood was likely to prevail in an action for alienation
of affections. 4 These causes of action are ancient and are entrenched in the law
of North Carolina. 5 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, abolished
these causes of action in the recent case of Cannon v. Miller,6 temporarily de-
stroying Haywood's hope of recovery. Haywood's chances for recovery, how-
ever, were restored three months later when the North Carolina Supreme Court
vacated the court of appeals' decision on procedural grounds and remanded the
case for trial.7 The supreme court made its reversal without reaching the merits
of the case and without reviewing the viability of causes of action for alienation
of affections and criminal conversation. This Note analyzes the court of appeals'
decision in Cannon and concludes that, despite the court of appeals' mispercep-
tion of its ability to abolish the causes of action, 8 the merits of the case were
correctly resolved.
1. Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460,460-61, 322 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1984), vacated, 313 N.C.
324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985).
2. "The poetic name 'Heart Balm' refers to a financial soothing of the pocketbook of a victim
in compensation for an unfortunate affaire de coeur." K. REDDEN, MODERN LEGAL GLOSSARY 241
(1980). A heart balm action is a legal term of art referring to civil actions for loss of romantic love.
Id. See infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
5. Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 595, 96 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1957). The court in Bishop
stated:
The existence of a cause of action for damages in favor of a husband against one who
wrongfully and maliciously alienates the affections of his wife depriving him of his conjugal
rights to her consortium has long been recognized in England and this country. This is a
fundamental common law right.
Id.
6. 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984), vacated, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985).
7. Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985). The supreme court allowed plain-
tiff's petition for discretionary review for "the sole purpose of vacating the decision of the Court of
Appeals purporting to abolish the causes of action for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conver-
sation." Id. The supreme court stated that the court of appeals had "acted under a misapprehension
of its authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and its responsibility
to follow those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court." Id.
8. See supra note 7.
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In Cannon the North Carolina Court of Appeals abolished the causes of
action for alienation of affections and for criminal conversation. Plaintiff hus-
band, acting pro se, brought both actions against Jeffrey Miller, a Pitt County
attorney, seeking a total of $250,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 9
In support of his action for alienation, he alleged that his wife had taken a job as
deputy clerk at the Pitt County Courthouse in May 1979, that she had become
acquainted with defendant that summer, and that by late September or early
October defendant had persuaded his wife to have sexual relations. Plaintiff al-
leged that defendant's activity" 'affected the will' of [his] wife and caused her 'to
transfer her love, loyalty, and devotion from this plaintiff to the defendant' " and
that "the influence was so strong that plaintiff's wife showed an 'obvious loss' of
the genuine love and affection that had existed during the marriage until that
time."'1 To support his action for criminal conversation, plaintiff alleged that
defendant had engaged in sexual relations with plaintiff's spouse at various times
before the divorce.1 1
Defendant responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
causes of action were unconstitutional, or, alternatively, were contrary to the
public policy of North Carolina. This motion was denied.1 2 The court did,
however, grant defendant's motion for summary judgment based on affidavits
and exhibits (the Cannons' divorce records) which indicated that the marriage
had been unhappy and that defendant's relationship with the spouse had begun
after the separation. 13 Plaintiff appealed, and defendant cross-appealed the de-
nial of his motion to dismiss. After holding that summary judgment had been
improperly granted, 14 the court of appeals agreed with defendant that the ac-
tions should have been dismissed. The court based its holding on its conclusion
that alienation of affections and criminal conversation are archaic concepts that
serve no purpose in modern society. 15
Criminal conversation and alienation of affections are tort actions that seek
to protect the marital relationship against intentional interference by third par-
ties. Along with seduction and breach of promise to marry, they are com-
monly-and derisively-termed "heart balm" actions since they purport to
award money damages for emotional harm.1 6 The specific interest protected is
one spouse's right to the other's consortium.1 7 Though these actions often are
brought against the same defendant and arise from the same set of events, they
are historically separate and involve different elements of proof.
Actions for alienation of affections evolved from a husband's common-law
right to recover from anyone who intentionally "enticed" his wife to leave the
9. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 460, 322 S.E.2d at 783.
10. Id. at 461, 322 S.E.2d at 783.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 461-62, 322 S.E.2d at 783.
13. Id. at 462, 322 S.E.2d at 783-84.
14. Id. at 463-70, 322 S.E.2d at 784-88.
15. Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 803-04.
16. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 929 (5th ed. 1984).
17. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
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home, with the result that he lost his wife's society and services.18 The action of
enticement was based on general common-law rules governing the master-ser-
vant relationship and the view that the wife was the husband's servant.19 This
principle was first articulated in the 1745 English case of Winsmore v. Green-
bank,20 and was commonly followed in this country,21 except in Louisiana. 22
North Carolina recognized the action of enticement in the 1849 case of Barbee v.
Armstead.23
Early actions in enticement had little to do with the emotional state of mar-
riage; rather, they sought to protect a husband's right to his wife's consortium.
Consortium, in its traditional sense, has been defined as "a bundle of legal rights
to the alliterative trio of the services, society, and sexual intercourse of the
wife."2 4 The wife's duty to the husband derived from her legally inferior posi-
tion, which essentially made her the husband's servant. One commentator
describing the wife's status observed:
It appears. . . that the foundation of the husband's right of action for
the loss of consortium is based on the idea that the wife is her hus-
band's servant, since an interference with the service of a servant is an
actionable trespass. The wife is sub virga viri sui, is classified with the
servants, and both wife and servants are considered chattels. The very
nature of the relationship and the duties which it imposed on the wife
together with her inferiority and subservience easily gave to the hus-
band proprietary interest in her, and in turn led to proprietary actions
for the loss of her services. 25
Actions for enticement, however, have little utility in an age in which the
wife is viewed as a partner in marriage rather than as her husband's servant.
Thus, enticement gave way to its modem counterpart, the action for alienation
of affections. The tort of alienation was first recognized in New York in 186626
18. 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 207, at 553-54 (4th ed. 1980); W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 917-18; Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33
MICH. L. REv. 979, 992-94 (1935).
19. Comment, Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation: Unholy Marriage in Need of
Annulment, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 323, 327-28 (1981).
Originally, a master could recover for physical injury to a servant if loss of services re-
sulted. Since a wife was viewed as a servant, a husband could also sue for the loss of the
wife's services when she was injured by the defendant. Later, to meet the labor crisis in
fourteenth century England resulting from the Black Death, a remedy was provided
against anyone who enticed servants away from their masters. Thus, the sources of the
original [action for alienation] had in common either physical injury to the servant or
physical removal (enticement) of the servant from the premises of the master.
Id.
20. 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745) (recognized husband's right against one who intentionally "per-
suaded, procured, or enticed" wife to leave home).
21. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 470-71, 322 S.E.2d at 788.
22. See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927) (refusing to recognize an action
for alienation of affections since damages would be essentially punitive, and such damages are not
allowed in civil cases under Louisiana law).
23. 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 530 (1849).
24. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 916.
25. Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. Rnv. 651, 653 (1930).
26. Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866).
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and eventually was adopted by all states except Louisiana.27 The basis of this
tort is the deprivation of the wife's affection for the husband, that is, a "loss of
love, society, companionship and comfort."' 28 Expanding the concept of consor-
tium to include emotional interests was a natural result of the conflict between
the older, strictly proprietary basis of enticement and newer, egalitarian ideas
about the legal status of women, morality, and the function of the family.29 A
1919 Colorado decision aptly described the new emphasis on affection rather
than on services: "There are two primary rights in the case; one is the right of
the plaintiff to the body of his wife and the other to her mind, unpolluted. 30
The plaintiff is required to establish three elements to sustain a cause of
action in alienation of affections:31 (1) a valid marriage, (2) the loss of affection
or consortium, 32 and (3) the wrongful and malicious conduct 33 of the defendant
that caused34 the loss of affection. Adultery is not a necessary element to a
cause of action in alienation since the interest protected is a spouse's right to
marital affection, not an exclusive right of sexual intercourse. Indeed, one com-
mentator has noted that in-laws are more likely to be defendants than are
"wicked lover[s]." 35
Criminal conversation 36 is simply a civil action for adultery. Like the early
action for enticement, criminal conversation was not concerned with emotional
damage to a marriage; rather, the interest protected was the "defilement of the
27. See supra note 22.
28. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 918.
29. See id. at 916; Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. Rav. 1
(1923); Lippman, supra note 25. But cf. 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 207, at 554 ("the basis of the
action is not merely a loss of affections but rather a loss of consortium"); Brown, The Action for
Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 472, 472 (1934) ("the gist of [the action] is not the loss of
affections but rather the loss of consortium").
30. Sullivan v. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170, 172, 180 P. 91, 91 (1919).
31. Litchfield v. Cox, 266 N.C. 622, 146 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592,
96 S.E.2d 870 (1957); Ridenhour v. Miller, 225 N.C. 543, 35 S.E.2d 611 (1945); Hankins v. Hankins,
202 N.C. 358, 162 S.E. 766 (1932).
32. A partial loss of affections is sufficient. 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 207, at 554.
33. To prove malice it is not necessary to show a "spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposi-
tion"; rather, one need only prove unjustifiable conduct injurious to another. Cottle v. Johnson, 179
N.C. 426, 429, 102 S.E. 769, 770 (1920).
Special rules apply when in-laws are defendants. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 207, at 558-59.
The relation of parent and child justifies the parent in giving counsel and advice in regard
to the child's marital affairs so long as the parent acts in good faith. The law recognizes
and respects not only the marital relation, but likewise the natural affection between a
parent and child. The rights of parents end at the border of good faith. When parents
advise and interfere with the marital relations of their children, the presumption is that
they have acted in good faith and for the child's welfare. A parent has a privilege which is
overcome only by proof of its abuse. The privilege has been extended to other near rela-
tives who are justified in giving advice in personal matters.
Id. at 559.
34. The standard for causation is lenient. A spouse need only demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was the controlling or effective cause even though other causes may have contributed to the
alienation. Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 96 S.E.2d 870 (1957).
35. 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 207, at 559. See generally, Brown, supra note 29, at 480-87
(discussion of in-laws as defendants in alienation actions).
36. The term "conversation" probably derives from the action's former status as an ecclesiasti-
cal crime. The term "conversation" was used euphemistically for intercourse. See W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 875 n.75 (4th ed. 1971).
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marriage bed, the blow to family honor, and the suspicion cast upon the legiti-
macy of the offspring."' 3 7 Thus, the essence of the criminal conversation action
is the husband's exclusive right to sexual relations with the wife, based both on a
need to maintain pure bloodlines for inheritance purposes and on principles of
morality.38 To establish a valid claim in criminal conversation, the husband has
to prove (1) a valid marriage and (2) sexual intercourse between the defendant
and the plaintiffs wife.39 In modem practice, actions for criminal conversation
are functionally indistinguishable from actions for alienation.4° Each serves as
heart balm, and the two are frequently brought together.4 1
Because of the husband's legal superiority to the wife and the proprietary
nature of his right to consortium, alienation of affections and criminal conversa-
tion were virtually strict liability torts. Consent and connivance of the husband
were the only recognized defenses to either tort.42 A wife's consent was consid-
ered irrelevant; because of the fictional legal unity of the spouses, the wife was
not legally capable of giving consent to a compromise of her husband's marital
rights.43 The plaintiff's own adultery was not a defense,44 nor was his subse-
quent condonation of his wife's behavior.45 Even a valid separation agreement
would not necessarily bar an action for alienation. 46 Similarly, mere separation
was no defense to criminal conversation.47 In modem practice the same rules
limiting available defenses apply.
Originally, only the husband could bring an action for alienation or for
criminal conversation. His exclusive right was based on the common law's rec-
ognition of his-and only his-right to consortium. As a virtual servant, the
wife's role in the marriage did not entitle her to a reciprocal interest in the hus-
band's consortium.48 Even if she had such an interest, she was unable to enforce
it; women were not permitted to bring actions independently until passage of the
37. 2 PL LEE, supra note 18, § 208, at 567; see also Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393, 403, 79
S.E. 872, 876 (1913) ("the wrong relates to. . . the dishonor of [the] marriage bed,. . . the suspi-
cion cast upon [the] legitimacy of the offspring . . . [and] the invasion and deprivation of...
exclusive marital rights and privileges").
38. Lippman, supra note 25, at 654-55; Comment, Piracy on the MatrimonialSeas-The Law
and The Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L.J. 594 (1971).
39. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938); Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C.
426, 428-29, 102 S.E. 769, 770 (1920); Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393, 402, 79 S.E. 872, 876
(1913).
40. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 919.
41. Id.
42. 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 208, at 571; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at
921; cf. Barker v. Dowdy, 223 N.C. 151, 25 S.E.2d 404 (1943) (condonation of wife's adultery does
not constitute a defense of connivance).
43. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938); Chestnut v. Sutton, 207
N.C. 256, 257, 176 S.E. 743, 743 (1934); Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 428-29, 102 S.E. 769, 770
(1920); Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458, 464, 297 S.E.2d 142, 147 (1982).
44. See Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 194, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938).
45. Barker v. Dowdy, 223 N.C. 151, 152, 25 S.E.2d 404, 404 (1943).
46. See Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 213-14, 170 S.E.2d 104, 111-12 (1969).
47. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938).
48. NV. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 915-16; Lippman, supra note 25, at
654-56.
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Married Women's Property Acts.49 Most states, including North Carolina, now
permit women to bring actions for alienation of affections or criminal
conversation.50
Most commentators view alienation of affections and criminal conversation
actions as devices to maintain family harmony and deter wrongful outside inter-
ference with the marriage.51 Few would contend that these are unworthy goals.
Yet the actions' effectiveness in achieving the desired ends is at best questiona-
ble, and the potential abuses and shortcomings of the actions are real and dan-
gerous. A policy decision to retain these actions must be based on a conclusion
that they are sufficiently effective to outweigh their inherent disadvantages. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals sided with the majority of jurisdictions and
commentators52 in concluding that the balance of factors demanded abolition:
Unarguably, the integrity of the marriage relation and the preservation
of marital harmony are interests deserving of judicial protection. Yet,
we find general agreement among the authorities who have examined
the issue that, on balance, the social harm engendered by the existence
of these torts . . . outweigh[s] the meritorious goals purportedly
served by the actions. 53
Thus, even though the court was willing to concede the existence of cases in
which a spouse had suffered genuine wrong, it concluded that "equity to the
plaintiff is not the only consideration." 54 The court's decision to abolish these
49. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 916; Lippman, supra note 25, at 656.
The wife's incapacity to sue was described bluntly in Hipp v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182
N.C. 9, 12, 108 S.E. 318, 319 (1921):
At common law the husband could maintain an action for the injuries sustained by his wife
for the same reason that he could maintain an action for injuries to his horse, his slave or
any other property; that is to say by reason of the fact that the wife was his chattel. This
was usually presented in the euphemism that "by reason of the unity of marriage" such
actions could be maintained by the husband. But singularly enough this was not correla-
tive and the wife could not maintain an action for injuries sustained by her husband.
Blackstone gave this explanation:
We may observe, that in these relative injuries notice is only taken of the wrong done to the
superior of the parties related [husband] by the breach and dissolution of either the relation
itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom; while the loss of the inferior [wife] by
such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for this may be this: that the inferior hath
no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is
held to have in those of the inferior, and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143 (emphasis added).
During the latter half of the 19th century all states enacted statutes, generally known as Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts, which removed much of the wife's legal disability. H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 7.2 (1968). Consequently, married wo-
men were allowed to acquire, own, and transfer property, to make contracts, to be employed, and
keep their earnings, and to sue and be sued. Id.
50. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 916; see, e.g., Townsend v. Holderby,
197 N.C. 550, 149 S.E. 855 (1929); Brown v. Brown, 124 N.C. 19, 32 S.E. 320 (1899).
51. See, eg., Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 988-89; Holbrook, supra note 29, at 4-6; Comment,
supra note 19, at 327; Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be Justified
Today?, 56 N.D.L. REV. 239, 250-52 (1980); Comment, supra note 38, at 613; Comment, Alienation
of Affections: Flourishing Anachronism, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 585 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Alienation of Affections: Flourishing Anachronism].
52. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
53. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 491, 322 S.E.2d at 800 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
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actions was based on its recognition of four significant drawbacks in allowing
actions for alienation and criminal conversation: the potential for abuse, the
lack of deterrent effect, the difficulty of determining causation, and the inappro-
priateness of recovery for emotional harm predicated on a property theory.55
First, the court stressed the great potential for abuse inherent in the aliena-
tion of affections and criminal conversation actions. Because these torts often
connote sexual misbehavior, the chance of blackmail always exists, as does the
possibility of unfounded claims that will damage reputation. 56 The threat of
bringing either action also may induce defendants to accept unfavorable extraju-
dicial settlements.57 In the event that such claims go to trial, the tinge of immo-
rality may distort the process of determining damages; connotations of
misbehavior may cause" 'emotion and moral indignation to prevail over consid-
erations of private or public injury in the assessment of damages.' s58
Second, the court in Cannon found no significant deterrent force in aliena-
tion of affections or criminal conversation actions. The possibility of an adverse
judgment and award does not enter into the minds of transgressors. Nor does
the policy of punishing only the outside party correspond to the reality of mari-
tal disintegration. The court noted that deterrence rests on the unrealistic as-
sumption of a harmonious husband-wife relationship that is destroyed by a
malicious intruder.59 It is more likely that" '[the] defendant becomes enmeshed
with [the] plaintiff's spouse without preconceived design, [and when] there is
such design, juries can scarcely be expected to. . . distinguish the pursuer from
the pursued.' "60 Under such circumstances the threat of a civil action can have
little deterrent effect.6 1 Furthermore, the publicity and stress of litigation asso-
ciated with the action would destroy any chance of reconciliation. 62 Indeed, the
court felt that the practical effect of money damages was to allow a plaintiff a
55. Id. at 491-92, 322 S.E.2d at 800-01.
56. Id. See H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 267; Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 996. Another
commentator made this assessment: "[T]he threat of exposure, publicity, and notariety [sic] is more
than sufficient to breed corruption, fraud, and misdealings on the part of unscrupulous persons in
bringing unjustified and maliicious [sic] suits." Comment, Criminal Conversation: Civil Action for
Adultery, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 495, 500 (1973).
57. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 491, 322 S.E.2d at 800.
58. Id. at 481, 322 S.E.2d at 794 (quoting Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 1009).
59. Id. at 480, 322 S.E.2d at 793; see also H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 267. Clark states:
[Tihe action for alienation is based on psychological assumptions that are contrary to fact
... .[V]iable, contented marriages are not broken up by the vile seducer of the Nine-
teenth Century melodrama, though this is what the suit for alienation assumes. In fact the
break-up is the product of many influences. It is therefore misleading and futile to suppose
that the threat of a damage suit can protect the marital relationship.
Id.
60. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 479, 322 S.E.2d at 793 (quoting Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 995).
61. Id. at 478-79, 322 S.E.2d at 793; see also Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Iowa
1978) (McCormick, J., dissenting). Judge McCormick stated in Bearbower
Many authoritative studies have been made of the nature of marriage and the cause, pre-
vention, and cure of marital failure. I have searched among them in vain for any support
for the. . . assumption that the existence of the alienation tort is a deterrent to marital
breakdown or a device for protecting the family unit.
Id. (McCormick, J., dissenting).
62. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 492, 322 S.E.2d at 800-01.
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"'forum for vindictiveness and posturing self-justification.' "63
A third flaw of heart balm actions is that the tort concept of causation is too
simplistic to reflect the dynamics of the usual marital breakup. 64 In actions for
alienation, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was the controlling
cause of the loss of affections. 65 To do so effectively it is necessary to conduct a
full inquiry into the marital history, the quality of the couple's relationship, and
the couple's deepest motives.66 Such investigations are difficult to conduct and
the results usually are inconclusive. The ability of psychologists to determine
the cause of a particular marital breakdown is questionable; 67 moreover, the
presence of the third party in a romantic triangle may not be causally related to
the decision to engage in extramarital activities.68 Indeed, the inability to deter-
mine causation may tempt juries to resolve the issue on moral grounds.6 9
Last, alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions reflect a
property basis for recovery that has no relevance to modem understandings of
psychology or social values. The court stated that these actions have never
shaken free from their proprietary origins.70 When the right to bring heart balm
actions was extended to women, the actions were not restructured to reflect
greater equality between spouses, changes in sexual mores, and newer views of
the family's function. 71 The retention of the rule against spousal consent as a
defense illustrates this point.72 The rule is based on the fictional unity of man
and wife,73 and logically cannot be justified since the fiction has been discarded.
Nevertheless, the rule against consent as a defense has been extended to both
63. Id. at 487, 322 S.E.2d at 798 (quoting Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa
1978) (McCormick, J., dissenting)). Clark has characterized these actions, in part, as a "forced sale
. . . of affections." H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 267.
64. See Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 478-80, 322 S.E.2d at 793-94; Comment, supra note 38, at
613-14.
65. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
66. H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 265-66; see also Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 995 ("An
expert social scientist would scarcely undertake to designate any one cause of disorganization as
'controlling' in a given case, yet the law confidently relies on the jury to make such a selection.").
67. W. GOODE, THE FAMILY 161-62 (2d ed. 1982).
From the beginning of divorce research, analysts have tried to pin down the 'causes' of
divorce, but with little success. Inquiries have reported what legal grounds the divorcing
couple uses, what complaints they make about each other outside that legal action, and
many of the factors associated with higher or lower rates of marital dissolution. It seems
unlikely that we shall locate any simple set of causes.
A few marriages doubtless end because of some single large cause, such as the
husband's violence or the wife's neurosis, but very likely most modem divorces are the
result of many diverse difficulties. These create a continuing cumulative process of conflict
during which both spouses gradually come to reject both the relationship and each other.
Id.
68. A. FROMME, THE PSYCHOLOGIST LooKs AT SEX AND MARRIAGE 207-25 (1950).
69. Comment, supra note 38, at 614.
70. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 492, 322 S.E.2d at 801; see also Brown, supra note 29, at 472
("Consortium is a property right, and it would seem to follow that the action for alienation of
affections is to be treated as one for a tort to property; even though . . . the damages are based
primarily upon personal injuries to the plaintiff.").
71. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
1324 [Vol. 63
husband and wife. Many commentators have noted that after the legal inferi-
ority of women-the very basis for alienation and criminial conversation-had
been eliminated by the Married Women's Property Acts, the courts could easily
have abolished the actions as unwarranted. 74 Instead, the courts chose to extend
the actions to women on a theory of the wife's equal interest in the marriage.75
The effect was to grant a proprietary interest in consortium to the wife as well as
the husband.76
The court of appeals in Cannon was offended by the notion of a proprietary
interest in love or affection: "common sense dictates that by definition these are
'rights' which can only be voluntarily given to one spouse by the other."'77 Since
"spousal love and all its incidents do not constitute property that is subject to
'theft' or 'alienation,' "78 the court concluded that actions for alienation of affec-
tions and criminal conversation have become "removed from the realm of social
reality." 79
It is difficult to quarrel with the court of appeals' conclusion in Cannon that
actions for alienation of affections and for criminal conversation should be abol-
ished. The ubiquitous possibilities for abuse, the absence of deterrent force, the
difficulty in assigning blame, and the patent backwardness of permitting a pro-
prietary interest in a spouse's affections clearly outweigh any utility these actions
may have in protecting the interests of the rare, totally innocent party who has
suffered a bona fide wrong. Nor would any measure short of eliminating both
actions have been meaningful. Retaining alienation of affections or criminal
conversation actions while allowing for a defense of consent would have been
tantamount to abolition given the consensual nature of the torts.80 A decision to
retain alienation of affections while eliminating criminal conversation would
have amounted to preserving a civil action for adultery, with the added element
of lost affections;81 problems with abuse, causation, and deterrence would have
remained. Conversely, retention of only the emotionally neutral action of crimi-
nal conversation would have required a proprietary approach to spousal rela-
tions that few would accept. Such an approach would have had the advantage of
ending questionable actions against meddlesome in-laws,8 2 but would not have
resolved questions of abuse, deterrence, causation, and the property basis for
recovery. Finally, limiting recovery to actual damage only could have protected
a defendant from an irrational jury and could not have afforded protection
74. Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 990; Lippman, supra note 25, at 662; Comment, supra note 19,
at 328-30.
75. See, eg., Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947).
76. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 476-77, 322 S.E.2d at 791.
77. Id. at 477, 322 S.E.2d at 792.
78. Id. at 492, 322 S.E.2d at 801.
79. Id. at 477, 322 S.E.2d at 792.
80. See Comment, supra note 19, at 339-40.
81. See Note, Hunt v. Hunt: The Status of the "Heartbalm" Torts in South Dakota, 27 S.D.L.
REv. 160, 169 (1982) (criticizing South Dakota Supreme Court's decision to abolish criminal con-
versation but to retain alienation of affections).
82. See Comment, Alienation of Affections Flourishing Anachronism, supra note 51, at 599-
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against the other shortcomings of the action described above.83
The court of appeals' decision is in accord with the current national trend
away from heart balm actions. To date, twenty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have either abolished alienation actions by statute or have prohibited
monetary recovery in such suits, 8 4 while two states have reduced the statute of
limitations to one year 85 and another state has eliminated punitive damages.8 6
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have legislatively abolished ac-
tions for criminal conversation or have prohibited monetary recovery in such
suits; 87 four states have shortened their statutes of limitations, 8 and at least
three others have limited the amount of damages recoverable.8 9 In eight states it
is a crime even to file a complaint alleging one or both causes of action.90 Other
states have judicially abolished criminal conversation and alienation. 91 The
83. See id. at 600.
84. ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (Supp. 1984-85); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-572b (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West 1984) (monetary damages not permitted); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-1-17 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 167 (1964); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 3-103 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2901 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.02 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
1-601 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.2 (1983) (monetary
damages not permitted); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1952) (monetary damages not permit-
ted); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAW § 80-a (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Page
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (with insignificant exceptions); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.840 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 170 (Purdon 1965) (with insignificant excep-
tions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (Supp. 1984) (monetary damages not permitted); VA. CODE§ 8.01-220 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (West 1981);
Wyo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977) (monetary damages not permitted).
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (Supp. 1984).
86. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 1 1901-07 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (limited to actual damages).
87. ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); CAL. Cr1. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572f (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West 1984) (mon-
etary damages not permitted); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-17 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1
(Burns 1973 & Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 553.02 (West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West
1952) (monetary damages not permitted); N.Y. Clv. RIGiTS LAw § 80-a (McKinney 1976); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1983-1984)
(with insignificant exceptions); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.850 (1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05
(Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (Supp. 1984) (monetary damages not permitted); VA.
CODE § 8.01-220 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (West 1981); WYo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977)
(monetary damages not permitted).
88. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1981) (one year); KY. REV. STAT. § 413.140(1)(c) (1972
& Supp. 1984) (one year); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1984) (two years);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980) (one year).
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 11 1951-57 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (limited to actual damages); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-37-50 (Law. Co-op 1976) (limitation on recoverable costs); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.84.040 (1962) (limitation on recoverable costs).
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 771.01 to -.05 (West 1964); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-4-1 to -3 (Bums
1973 & Supp. 1984); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-301 (1980) (alienation only); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-601 to -604 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23-1 to -3 (West 1952); N.Y. Civ.
RIG=rs LAW §§ 80-a to 81 (McKinney 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.01 to -.03 (West Supp.
1981); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-23-101 to -103 (1977).
91. Four state supreme courts have abolished criminal conversation: Bearbower v. Merry, 266
N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980); Fadgen v. Leyker, 469
Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1981).
Two courts have eliminated actions in alienation of affections: Funderman v. Mickelson, 304
supreme courts of four states, although disapproving of these actions, have left
the question of abolition to the legislatures.92 The trend away from heart balm
actions is also reflected among the commentators. Indeed, it is difficult to find
recent commentary that advocates the retention of alienation or criminal
conversation. 9
3
The importance of the Cannon decision, however, goes beyond the narrow
issues of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. It reflects a trend in
North Carolina's domestic relations law toward removing fault as an element in
the dissolution of marriage. With insignificant exceptions, divorce is available to
either spouse regardless of fault.94 Equitable distribution of marital property
proceeds on the presumption that an equal division is fair unless certain factors
relating to the needs or contribution of one spouse are present;95 fault is not
among the factors.96 Similarly, although a showing of fault is a prerequisite to
alimony, 97 the award is limited to dependent spouses9 8 and the amount is gov-
erned by need.99 Adultery, however, is still a bar to alimony, 1° ° and a trial
judge may reduce an award in light of a dependent spouse's fault.101 Even so,
these recognitions of fault constitute only a limitation on the supporting spouse's
obligations and not a remedy for marital misconduct.
Because of the decreased role of fault in the dissolution of marriage and its
attendant economic consequences, the maintenance of actions for alienation of
affections and for criminal conversation seems incongruous. If the aggrieved
spouse has few rights against the offending spouse arising from marital fault,
clearly the aggrieved spouse should have fewer rights against a third party. The
court of appeals' decision in Cannon, therefore, could have harmonized North
N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981); Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980). But see Nelson
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (affirming cause of action but requiring plaintiff to show that
the causal effect of defendant's conduct outweighed all other causes, including conduct of plaintiff
and spouse).
92. Gorder v. Sims, 306 Minn. 275, 237 N.W.2d 67 (1975) (alienation retained); Kremer v.
Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W. 582 (1978) (criminal conversation retained); Dube v. Rochette, 11
N.H. 129, 262 A.2d 288 (1970) (alienation retained); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.
1973) (criminal conversation retained).
93. See, eg., H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2; Comment, supra note 19; Note, supra note 51;
Note, supra note 81; Comment, supra note 38; Comment, Alienation of Affection: Flourishing Anach-
ronism, supra note 51. But see Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional
Interference with the Marital Relationship, 48 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 426 (1972) (author advocates
elimination of criminal conversation but retention of alienation of affections with adultery as an
element).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984) (providing for divorce after one year's separation); see also
id. § 50-5.1 (special provision for divorce based on a spouse's insanity).
95. Id. § 50-20(c).
96. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently has ruled that marital fault is not a
proper consideration under section 50-20(c)(12). See Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 321
S.E.2d 161 (1984). For a discussion of Hinton, see Note, Hinton v. Hinton-Equitable Distribution
Without Consideration of Marital Fault, 63 N.C.L. REv. 1204 (1985).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1984).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 50-16.5 (1985); see also Lemons v. Lemons, 22 N.C. App. 303, 206 S.E.2d 327 (1974)
(alimony awarded not as punishment for broken marriage, but for demonstrated need).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(a) (1984).
101. Id. § 50-16.5(b).
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Carolina's tort law with the state's policy of deemphasizing fault in divorce if it
had been allowed to stand. Because of the supreme court's summary reversal of
Cannon, however, actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation
are still part of the law in North Carolina. Thus, a spouse is given an acknowl-
edgment of fault in tort that the divorce statutes deny.
Similarly, the decision could have eliminated an unfair disparity in the law
of interference with family relationships. Unlike a spouse, a child has no cause
of action against a third party who causes the alienation of a parent's affections.
In the 1949 case of Henson v. Thomas,102 the North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that since a parent is under no legal obligation to love his or her children, a
child could not hold a third party liable for the parent's withdrawal of affections.
The court distinguished between the parent-child relationship and a marriage,
noting that a spouse's right to maintain actions for alienation and criminal con-
versation was recognized only because of the "common law conception of the
husband's property right in the person of his wife." 10 3 Unquestionably, the par-
ent-child relationship is as important to society as the marital relationship. It is
illogical to allow a cause of action in one situation and to withhold it in another.
Cannon was not a subtle decision, nor was it a difficult one. The court of
appeals may have misperceived its authority to change the law, but it did not fail
to recognize the need to do so. Alienation of affections and criminal conversa-
tion originate from the need to discourage or vindicate violations of proprietary
interests that no longer exist; these actions are ill-suited to protecting the emo-
tional interests that characterize the ideal modem marital relationship. Mar-
riages must stand or fall according to their own strengths and weaknesses.
There is no reason for the state to provide a forum in which the estranged spouse
can bitterly assign fault for a failed marriage. Cannon, nevertheless, has been
remanded to Pitt County Superior Court for trial. There the parties will litigate
the complex questions of marital breakdown in a tort action rooted in the medie-
val concept that a wife is her husband's chattel. Eventually the North Carolina
Supreme Court will be able to decide Cannon or a similar case on the merits of
abolishing actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. When
that opportunity arises, the court of appeals' decision in Cannon should be per-
suasive in closing North Carolina's courts to disputes such as the one between
Haywood Cannon and Jeffrey Miller.
JAMES LEONARD
102. 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949).
103. Id. at 174, 56 S.E.2d at 433.
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